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DEBT STIGMA AND SOCIAL CLASS 
Michael D. Sousa 
ABSTRACT 
For as long as creditors have been extending credit to consumer 
debtors, Western society has stigmatized those individuals who failed to 
repay their financial obligations or who found themselves swamped by 
unmanageable debt. Over the past three decades, scholars have studied 
whether the stigma surrounding indebtedness and bankruptcy has declined 
or increased in American society, mainly due to the sharp spike in 
consumer bankruptcy filings during the 1990s. 
These studies have resulted in a general debate over whether debt 
stigma still exists in society. Absent from the scholarly literature to date is 
an exploration of whether debtors from different social classes have varied 
conceptions of what it means to be financially indebted or to file for 
bankruptcy protection. Consequently, this Article is the first attempt to 
study empirically whether debt stigma varies by socioeconomic class. 
Using quantitative data from the General Social Survey, the findings 
of this study suggest a systematic pattern between debt stigma and social 
class. Specifically, the higher an individual’s social position based upon 
factors such as income, education, occupational prestige, and self-
identified social class, the greater the likelihood of agreeing with the idea 
that an individual has a right to commit suicide as a result of serious 
financial problems. This measure reflects whether one would or should 
feel shame, stigma, or embarrassment because of troubling financial debt. 
This quantitative finding is then situated within the social psychology 
literature, opining that finding oneself in severe financial straits has a 
direct bearing on a person’s social identity and self-esteem—matters 
inherently tied to social class. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between debtor and creditor is one of unequals. 
While it may be the case that at the inception of their relationship the 
parties may be of equal standing, once the creditor dispenses the funds to 
the debtor a “logic of hierarchy takes hold[,]”1 whereby the debtor can only 
restore herself to equality through the full repayment of the indebtedness. 
The failure to repay the debt is much more than simple economics—
notions of morality undergird the entire debtor–creditor relationship.2 
Indeed, in the languages of early Western Europe, the word “debt” was 
synonymous with “fault,” “sin,” and “guilt.”3 More significantly, the 
maxim “one must pay one’s debts” has been taken as a foregone virtue 
since the earliest civilizations.4 The failure to repay one’s financial 
obligations has historically been viewed as a shirking of one’s 
responsibilities.5 
This underlying notion of morality in the debtor–creditor relationship 
is exemplified by both religious doctrine and Western European history. 
“The world’s major religions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism, 
have always instilled in their followers a moral code and conviction that 
they must avoid becoming a debtor and, if the follower does become a 
debtor, then they stress the importance of repaying one’s financial 
obligations.”6 As perhaps a consequence of these religious teachings, 
broken financial promises led to extremely harsh treatment of debtors both 
in Europe and in the United States prior to the mid-nineteenth century.7 
The historical record is replete with evidence of debtors and “bankrupts” 
being subjected to various forms of punishment, including pillory and 
indentured servitude, in addition to various public shaming rituals.8 
The physical harshness by which society historically treated debtors 
has now faded, of course, but the moral opprobrium directed at individuals 
                                                     
 1. DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 121 (2011); see also BRETT WILLIAMS, 
DEBT FOR SALE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE CREDIT TRAP 6 (2004) (describing the debtor–creditor 
relationship as “embodied domination”). 
 2. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 395–
96 (2001) (“Individual bankruptcy has been morally condemned throughout most of human history.”). 
 3. GRAEBER, supra note 1. 
 4. According to David M. Tucker, Benjamin Franklin transformed notions of frugality and 
repaying debt “into part of the middle-class ethic.” See DAVID M. TUCKER, THE DECLINE OF THRIFT 
IN AMERICA: OUR CULTURAL SHIFT FROM SAVING TO SPENDING 9–10 (1991). 
 5. GRAEBER, supra note 1, at 4; see also Douglas R. Rendleman, Bankruptcy Revision: 
Procedure and Process, 53 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1975) (noting generally that “[s]ociety believes 
that people should pay just debts”). 
 6. Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 446 
(2013). 
 7. See Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 365, 366 
(2006). 
 8. Sousa, supra note 6, at 448. 
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who either cannot pay back their debts or who file for bankruptcy 
protection is arguably as stinging as ever.9 From a cultural perspective, 
personal indebtedness is still considered “a matter of self-indulgence” in 
both the United States and most Western European countries.10 Despite 
the combination of stagnant wages and the emergence of significant 
income inequality in the United States since the 1970s,11 together with a 
shifting of the social safety net away from government and corporations 
and onto the shoulders of individuals and families,12 American society still 
stigmatizes those who fail in the economic game of life by incurring 
unmanageable financial debt. 
The most powerful way for a debtor to relieve herself of the pressures 
of unmanageable debt is to file for bankruptcy with the goal of receiving 
a “discharge” of indebtedness.13 Most scholarly attention regarding the 
stigmatization of debt has been in the context of bankruptcy law, perhaps 
for obvious reasons. Since the passage of the modern Bankruptcy Code in 
1978,14 scholars and commentators have debated whether the stigma 
surrounding indebtedness and filing for bankruptcy still exists, and if so, 
whether this stigma has either increased or declined in the roughly three 
decades following 1978.15 This debate took on greater relevance in the 
                                                     
 9. See Zywicki, supra note 2, at 396–97 (“The emergence of this moral indignation is ‘aroused 
by the perception of injustice; as such it is part of the emotional underpinning of human morality.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
 10. See GRAEBER, supra note 1, at 379. 
 11. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION 
SYSTEM 48–49 (2007). 
 12. JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 21 (2008). 
 13. Nancy C. Dreher & Matthew E. Roy, Bankruptcy Fraud and Nondischargeability Under 
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 69 N.D. L. REV. 57, 57 (1993) (“The most sweeping remedy 
available to a debtor in bankruptcy is the discharge of the debtor’s personal liability to his or her 
creditors.”). 
 14. For a historical discussion of the development of bankruptcy law in the United States, see 
generally F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003) 
(1919); DAVID A. SKEEL JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 
(2001); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935); Charles Jordan Tabb, 
The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995). 
 15. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
187, 194 (1998) (arguing that “the increase in filing rates might be attributed to a decline in social 
sanctions for promise-breaking and the loss of a sense of shame one feels when such values are 
internalized”); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 483 (2006) (discussing the justifications for the shift in societal sentiments 
regarding filing for bankruptcy); Efrat, supra note 7, at 392 (“Hence, the data suggest that the attitudes 
of the American people about bankruptcy petitioners changed in the United States following the 1960s 
and have become more sympathetic towards bankruptcy petitioners.”); Sousa, supra note 6, at 463 
(finding in a qualitative study that “the overwhelming majority of debtors experienced deep feelings 
of shame and embarrassment” about having to file for bankruptcy); Zywicki, supra note 2, at 405 (“It 
is generally accepted that one of the factors driving the upward trend in bankruptcy filing rates in 
recent decades has been a general decline in the social stigma associated with filing bankruptcy.”) 
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mid-1990s when the bankruptcy courts experienced a significant spike in 
the number of consumer bankruptcy filings, albeit at a time when the 
economy was generally robust.16 As a consequence of this phenomenon, 
the credit industry commenced a successful campaign convincing 
Congress that individual debtors were “abusing” the bankruptcy process 
by filing for bankruptcy at a time when they had the capacity to repay all 
or a portion of their debts.17 The 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA) were predicated, in part, on the belief that debtors were 
abusing the bankruptcy process and that the shame and stigma associated 
with bankruptcy had eroded.18 
In the past, scholars have studied the phenomenon of debt and 
bankruptcy stigma using both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. The past qualitative studies (including my own) explored 
bankruptcy and debt stigma by sampling on the dependent variable, 
namely, by interviewing individuals who had filed for bankruptcy 
protection or who enrolled in Debtors Anonymous, and gauging their 
thoughts and experiences about the entire process, including feelings of 
stigma and shame.19 To date, the quantitative studies have examined debt 
                                                     
(citation omitted). See generally Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: 
Debtor Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 39 (1998) (“At bottom, the creditors’ 
argument that there is no more stigma is really based upon circular reasoning. According to the 
creditors, there are so many bankruptcies these days, so there must not be any more stigma.”); Teresa 
A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 
214–15 (2006) (“The data we present are not consistent with the claim that declining bankruptcy 
stigma has fueled an increase in bankruptcy filings. Instead, the data are far more consistent with the 
hypothesis that increased filings result from increased financial distress, and they hint that, despite 
loud claims to the contrary, the stigma of bankruptcy may actually be increasing.”); Scott A. Fay, Erik 
Hurst & Michelle J. White, The Bankruptcy Decision: Does Stigma Matter? (Dep’t of Econ., Univ. of 
Mich., Ann Arbor, Working Paper No. 98-01, 1998), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=70915 (opining from a quantitative analysis that the social disapproval of bankruptcy 
has decreased over time). 
 16. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE 
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 3 (2000). 
 17. Michael D. Sousa, The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contemporary Theory of the 
Bankruptcy Discharge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 553, 571 (2010); see also Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy 
and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle Over Problem Definition, 33 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003) (“Debtor-oriented groups blame creditors for the large amount of credit 
card debt and consider this the cause of increased filings. The pro-creditor groups blame individuals 
for not being responsible consumers and abusing the bankruptcy system.”) (internal citations omitted); 
James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006) (“Critics maintain that the 
increase in [bankruptcy] filings is attributable to the disappearance of shame and to the new generosity 
of the bankruptcy law that came with, and as a result of, the Code of 1978.”) (citation omitted). 
 18. Sousa, supra note 6, at 437. 
 19. See generally Terrell A. Hayes, Stigmatizing Indebtedness: Implications for Labeling 
Theory, 23 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 29 (2000); Sousa, supra note 6; Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, 
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and bankruptcy stigma indirectly, using various econometric models to 
test whether general stigma surrounding indebtedness and filing for 
bankruptcy increased or decreased, particularly during the 1990s when 
bankruptcy filing rates spiked significantly.20 
This quantitative study takes a different approach by examining the 
existence of debt stigma more directly through a nationally representative 
sample of Americans who participated in the biannual General Social 
Survey (“GSS”) conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago.21 Very 
few large-scale, representative, or longitudinal datasets ask respondents 
about debt or bankruptcy. However, commencing on a fairly consistent 
basis since the 1980s, the GSS has asked respondents a question that 
reflects one’s attitude towards severe indebtedness: “Do you think a 
person has the right to end his or her own life if this person has gone 
bankrupt?” However, the GSS does not specify to respondents what “gone 
bankrupt” means, namely, whether this is synonymous with filing for 
bankruptcy protection. Consequently, the phrase “gone bankrupt” could 
mean different things to different individuals. It is possible that 
respondents could interpret “gone bankrupt” to mean either: (1) actually 
filing for bankruptcy; (2) having severe debt problems together with the 
inability to pay back this debt; (3) having an income insufficient to keep 
up with current debt payment obligations; or (4) having assets valued at 
less than the extent of the individual’s outstanding debts. Regardless of 
how respondents may internalize the import of this survey question, it is 
reasonable to presume that it prompts respondents to ponder whether 
having financial difficulties is serious enough that suicide would be an 
acceptable response to the financial strain. 
For purposes of this Article, an affirmative response to this survey 
question is used as a proxy for the stigma surrounding debt. That is, a “yes” 
response is considered a reflection of the shame, stigma, and 
embarrassment one would or should feel (internally or externally) over 
being indebted to a significant degree. Methodologically, the GSS 
                                                     
supra note 15, at 213; Deborah Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal 
Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77 (2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Kartik Athreya, Shame as It Ever Was: Stigma and Personal Bankruptcy, 90 FED. 
RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q., Spring 2004, at 1 (using levels of unsecured borrowing and 
bankruptcy filing rates to explain the existence of stigma); Fay, Hurst & White, supra note 15 (using 
aggregate bankruptcy filing rates at the national and state levels to test for the presence of bankruptcy 
stigma); David. B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Explaining the Increase in Bankruptcy and 
Delinquency: Stigma vs. Risk-Composition (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Univ. of Pa., Working Paper 98-
28-B, 1998), http://d1c25a6gwz7q5e.cloudfront.net/papers/53.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2VF-LD4U] 
(contending that debt stigma had declined in the mid-1990s based upon increased credit card 
delinquencies). 
 21. See generally NORC, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, http://gss.norc.org [perma.cc/8H6S-
8K7E]. 
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question is being treated as one concerning debt stigma rather than suicide 
precisely because the question does not ask respondents whether they 
themselves would commit suicide or presently have feelings about suicide 
due to their own indebtedness.22 
To date, the scholarly literature on debt and bankruptcy stigma has 
generally treated all debtors as a singular class of individuals. Absent from 
this literature, however, is an examination of whether debtors from 
different social classes have varied conceptions of what it means to be 
indebted or to file for bankruptcy protection. This Article adds to the 
current literature on the stigma surrounding debt by exploring whether 
individuals experience and perceive indebtedness differently according to 
their social position. As Brett Williams has astutely noted, from a cultural 
and sociological perspective, people “experience and imagine debt 
according to different social positions.”23 Consequently, this Article is the 
first study to empirically address notions of debt stigma according to social 
class. 
The data from this empirical study suggest that the higher an 
individual’s position based upon factors of social class—such as income, 
educational level, occupational prestige, and self-identified social class—
the higher the odds an individual will agree with the “suicide upon going 
bankrupt” survey question (hereinafter the “debt–stigma” or “suicide-
upon-bankruptcy” question). This quantitative finding is then situated 
within the sociological social psychology literature, theorizing that finding 
oneself in severe financial straits or resorting to the bankruptcy process 
                                                     
 22. There is robust literature in the social sciences regarding the association between 
socioeconomic disadvantage and mental health, including suicide. See, e.g., Patricia Drentea & John 
R. Reynolds, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: The Relative Importance of Debt and SES for 
Mental Health Among Older Adults, 24 J. AGING & HEALTH 673, 688 (2012) (arguing that “in modern 
society, indebtedness is a key component underlying the relationship between socioeconomic position 
and mental health”). See generally Sarah Bridges & Richard Disney, Debt and Depression, 29 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 388 (2010) (finding that respondents who subjectively perceived themselves as having 
debt problems reported a greater incidence of depression); Sarah Brown, Karl Taylor & Stephen 
Wheatley Price, Debt and Distress: Evaluating the Psychological Cost of Credit, 26 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 642 (2005) (finding empirically that heads of households reporting substantial debt have 
significantly lower levels of psychological well-being compared to those without any debt); Simon 
Hatcher, Debt and Deliberate Self-Poisoning, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 111 (1994) (finding a high 
prevalence of debt problems among self-poisoning psychiatric patients); R. Jenkins et al., Debt, 
Income and Mental Disorder in the General Population, 38 PSYCHOL. MED. 1485 (2008) (finding that 
the more debt an individual possessed, the more likely that he or she suffered from mental disorder, 
neurosis, psychosis, alcohol dependency, or drug dependency); H. Meltzer et al., Personal Debt and 
Suicide Ideation, 41 PSYCHOL. MED. 771 (2011) (finding personal debt to be a significant correlate of 
suicide ideation among respondents in a national survey of psychiatric morbidity of adults in England); 
Deborah Thorne, Extreme Financial Strain: Emergent Chores, Gender Inequality and Emotional 
Distress, 31 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 185 (2010) (finding that indebted wives reported instances of 
depression as well as thoughts of suicide and death). 
 23. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8. 
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has a direct bearing on a person’s identity and self-esteem—matters 
inherently tied to social class. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I details the prior scholarly 
literature on debt and bankruptcy stigma; Part II discusses the study’s 
methodology and presents the quantitative findings; Part III offers a 
discussion through which the statistical findings on debt stigma and class 
are situated within the social psychology literature on social identity and 
self-esteem; and the Conclusion suggests further avenues of study. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW: PAST STUDIES ON DEBT 
AND BANKRUPTCY STIGMA 
In 1998, Professors Scott Fay, Erik Hurst, and Michelle White 
released an unpublished paper on bankruptcy stigma.24 Utilizing a dataset 
derived from the 1996 session of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,25 
Professors Fay, Hurst, and White developed an econometric model of the 
bankruptcy filing decision in order to test two hypotheses: whether (1) 
“debtors respond to economic incentives in filing for bankruptcy” (that is, 
whether debtors are more prone to file for bankruptcy as the economic 
incentive for doing so rises) and (2) “stigma plays an important role in 
explaining bankruptcy filings.”26 Considering bankruptcy stigma to be an 
expense of filing for bankruptcy due to “the costs of self-disapproval and 
disapproval by others,”27 Fay, Hurst, and White predicted that where this 
expense of bankruptcy decreases (i.e., less stigma associated with 
bankruptcy), an increase in the probability of filing for bankruptcy will 
occur.28 
To measure decreased stigma quantitatively, Fay, Hurst, and White 
relied on essentially two predictors: (1) the number of lawyers per 1,000 
people in a particular debtor’s state of residence in a given year (based 
upon the assumption that an increase in lawyers practicing in a region 
translates into increased competition and consequently lower legal fees 
and heightened attorney advertising, thus leading to increased awareness 
and reduced stigma) and (2) “attitudes toward bankruptcy are assumed to 
                                                     
 24. Fay, Hurst & White, supra note 15. 
 25. Conducted by the University of Michigan beginning in 1968, the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics “is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals (men, women, and 
children) and the family units in which they reside. It emphasizes the dynamic aspects of economic 
and demographic behavior, but its content is broad, including sociological and psychological 
measures.” Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 16, at 245 n.90 (citation omitted). 
 26. Fay, Hurst & White, supra note 15, at 2. 
 27. Id. at 6–7. In their economic model, Fay, Hurst, and White also account for other costs 
associated with filing for bankruptcy, including out-of-pocket costs for filing fees, costs of attorneys’ 
fees, informational costs regarding learning about the bankruptcy process, and the costs of reduced 
availability of credit post-bankruptcy. Id. 
 28. Id. at 9. 
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depend on the number of people in the area who have filed for bankruptcy 
in the past few years.”29 In other words, Fay, Hurst, and White found that 
the greater the percentage of individuals in a geographic region who filed 
for bankruptcy in the past several years indicated a reduced stigma 
regarding the bankruptcy process. This is due to “the spread of information 
and change in attitudes that results from high past bankruptcy filing 
rates,”30 or what the authors characterize as the “contagion” effect.31 After 
running their regression models, Fay, Hurst, and White opined that the 
social disapproval of bankruptcy had decreased, which had “caused more 
households to file for bankruptcy.”32 In short, Fay, Hurst, and White 
determined an increase in the number of bankruptcy filings is indicative 
of an inverse proxy for stigma. 
Shortly after the release of Fay, Hurst, and White’s study, Professors 
David B. Gross and Nicholas S. Souleles offered their own unpublished 
econometric study of bankruptcy stigma.33 Reacting to the well-
documented rise in consumer bankruptcy filings during the 1990s, Gross 
and Souleles sought to investigate the two leading explanations for the 
increased filings: the “risk effect,” whereby recent credit extensions to a 
more risky populace resulted in greater defaults, and the “stigma effect,” 
whereby it was believed that consumers had become increasingly willing 
to default on their financial obligations.34 The dataset utilized by Gross 
and Souleles comprised several hundred thousand individual credit card 
accounts open during 1995.35 The primary units of analysis were not flesh 
and blood individuals but rather their credit card accounts.36 
Gross and Souleles tracked these individual credit card accounts for 
a period of twenty-four to thirty-two months “to estimate hazard functions 
for consumer default, for both bankruptcy and credit card delinquency, and 
to assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting 
default.”37 The authors’ principal finding was that after controlling for the 
“risk effect” (i.e., less creditworthy borrowers obtaining credit, which then 
led to increased defaults) and other variables such as account age, payment 
history, economic conditions, and purchase history, “a given account was 
more likely to go bankrupt in 1996 and 1997 than in 1995.”38 According 
                                                     
 29. Id. at 13. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 27. 
 33. Gross & Souleles, supra note 20. 
 34. Id. at 1. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. Id. at 12. On this note, Gross and Souleles conclude as follows: 
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to Gross and Souleles, these results “are consistent with the view that most 
of the recent increase in default is due to a decline in stigma.”39 
In 2004 Kartik Athreya, a staff economist at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond, issued the results of his econometric study, which 
concluded that the stigma associated with bankruptcy “is by no means 
dead” and in fact still played a significant role in the bankruptcy rate.40 
Athreya’s model suggested that the increased bankruptcy filing rates 
during the 1990s were attributed not necessarily to a diminished stigma 
associated with bankruptcy but rather to the reduced costs to financial 
institutions of extending credit to debtors, as well as to increased 
competitiveness among financiers in unsecured credit card lending.41 
In 2006, Professors Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay 
Westbrook culled data from their long-standing Consumer Bankruptcy 
Project42 to test the claim that the stigma associated with consumer 
bankruptcy had fallen over time. Responding directly to the previous 
econometric studies, Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
criticized that when the econometric studies cannot “find a strong 
statistical correlation between bankruptcy and a handful of 
macroeconomic indicators,” the economists attribute the precipitous rise 
in bankruptcy filings “to the unmeasured concept that they conveniently 
label[ ] as a reduction in stigma.”43 That is, these econometric studies 
assume a decline in stigma is the operative indicator for what otherwise 
cannot be explained.44 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook opined that if bankruptcy stigma 
had declined from 1981 to 2001, then there would be an appreciable 
change in the financial circumstances of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors 
over this twenty-year period.45 More particularly, if stigma indeed 
declined over the years from 1981 to 2001, the authors predicted a marked 
increase in the presence of “better off” or “can pay” debtors among the 
                                                     
Even after controlling for risk-composition and other economic fundamentals, the 
propensity to default significantly increased between mid-1995 and mid-1997. A credit 
card holder in 1997 was 1 percentage point more likely to declare bankruptcy and 4 
percentage points more likely to go delinquent than a cardholder with identical risk 
characteristics in 1995. 
Id. at 15. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Athreya, supra note 20, at 3. 
 41. Id. at 16. 
 42. The Consumer Bankruptcy Project consists of “three large studies of natural persons filing 
for bankruptcy in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 in 1981, 1991, and 2001.” Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, 
supra note 15, at 218. 
 43. Id. at 216–17. 
 44. Id. at 217 n.16. 
 45. Id. at 236. 
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Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 pool of bankruptcy petitions.46 The authors 
tested this hypothesis by examining the debt-to-income ratio of debtors in 
their dataset; according to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, if the stigma 
had declined, then there should be a decreased median debt-to-income 
ratio for the group of debtors as a whole.47 
However, they did not find this to be the case. Instead, as a group, 
the debtors were much worse off financially in 2001 than in 1981. The 
debt-to-income ratio through the twenty-year period rose from 1.4 to 3.0 
for overall debt (i.e., total debt owed per debtor in 1981 was approximately 
eighteen months’ worth of income, whereas it jumped to approximately 
three years’ worth of income in 2001) and from 0.79 to 1.5 for non-
mortgage debt-to-income.48 The authors thus concluded as follows: 
Instead of finding more can-pay debtors in bankruptcy, our data 
suggest that even the most-able-to-pay debtors are in worse shape in 
2001 than in 1981. In 1981, the top 10% of bankrupt debtors best able 
to pay owed an average of 17% of their annual incomes in 
nonmortgage debt; in 2001 they also owed 17% of a year’s income. 
But the ratio of total debts to annual income got significantly worse: 
the average total debt-to-income ratio rose from 30% of income to 
63% . . . . 
. . . . There is no evidence of a cohort of convenience filers who in 
2001 were willing to enter bankruptcy with lighter debt burdens 
because they were no longer troubled by the stigma imposed by 
bankruptcy in times past. It would be hard to produce more 
compelling evidence that the rise in bankruptcy filings cannot be 
attributed in any significant part to a decline in the stigma associated 
with bankruptcy.49 
From this, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued that contrary to 
those who professed a decline in bankruptcy stigma, the phenomenon had 
not declined since the enactment of the modern Bankruptcy Code.50 
Instead, the marked increase in bankruptcy filings from 1981 to 2001 was 
attributed to individuals experiencing increased financial distress in their 
lives.51 
Much like Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, Professors F.H. 
Buckley and Margaret F. Brinig conducted their own empirical study to 
shed light on the dramatic rise in consumer bankruptcy filings from 1985 
                                                     
 46. Id. at 237–38. 
 47. Id. at 238. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 239. 
 50. Id. at 214–15. 
 51. Id. 
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to 1991. This period was ironically marked by national economic 
prosperity and changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 that were designed 
to make the use of Chapter 7 less palatable for some debtors.52 Buckley 
and Brinig utilized a regression analysis of consumer bankruptcy filing 
rates with various legal, economic, and social variables for eighty-six 
federal judicial districts from the period of 1980 to 1991.53 According to 
the authors, neither legal variables, such as the level of allowable assets 
exempt from creditors’ reach, nor economic variables, such as 
unemployment rate and incidence of poverty, were able to explain the 
increased filing rates during this period.54 Rather, Buckley and Brinig 
suggested that the increased filing rate during this time was attributable to 
changes in social norms and, more particularly, to a decline in the social 
sanctions surrounding bankruptcy, along with an overall weakening of the 
social stigma of promise-breaking.55 
In response to what he perceived as the shortcomings of previous 
empirical studies on bankruptcy stigma, namely, the inability of both the 
econometric and statistical approaches to sufficiently represent the general 
public’s perception of bankruptcy stigma, Professor Rafael Efrat sought to 
measure the evolution of bankruptcy stigma over time by examining the 
content of 176 newspaper articles published in the New York Times 
between 1864 and 2002.56 According to Efrat, the “examination of the 
content of consumer bankruptcy related newspaper articles provides 
valuable insight into the evolution of public perception of bankrupts 
during th[is] period.”57 Efrat’s study of the newspaper articles enabled him 
to ascertain the “embedded messages” contained within the articles and to 
evaluate whether a particular article struck a positive, negative, or neutral 
tone with respect to filing for bankruptcy, the characterization of 
bankruptcy debtors, and the validity of seeking formal debt relief under 
the then-existing bankruptcy legislation.58 
Efrat used the embedded messages “as a proxy for broad and 
evolving societal perceptions about the bankruptcy population.”59 The 
result of Efrat’s study suggests a shift in the discourse regarding 
bankruptcy stigma commencing in the 1960s.60 As Efrat found, prior to 
                                                     
 52. Buckley & Brinig, supra note 15, at 187. 
 53. For a detailed discussion of Professors Buckley and Brinig’s methodology, see id. at 191–
202. 
 54. Id. at 202. 
 55. Id. at 200–02. 
 56. Efrat, supra note 7, at 385. 
 57. Id. at 385. 
 58. Id. at 386–88. 
 59. Id. at 388. 
 60. Id. at 389. 
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the 1960s, the New York Times newspaper articles referred to bankruptcy 
debtors in negative terms, such as “evil doers,” “cheaters,” and “crooks[,]” 
while attributing debtors’ financial failures as self-imposed.61 In contrast, 
newspaper articles beginning in the 1960s adopted a more positive attitude 
towards bankruptcy debtors, often characterizing them as “hardworking, 
poor, struggling, and needy”62 while at the same time attributing their 
respective financial woes to exogenous events, such as unemployment, 
high inflation, medical illness, or divorce.63 Based on this, Efrat argued 
that the public’s attitude towards debtors who file for bankruptcy has 
softened over time, calling into question whether bankruptcy stigma has 
indeed diminished during the last approximately 150 years.64 
Professor Terrell Hayes conducted a series of in-depth interviews 
with forty-six members of Debtors Anonymous in an effort to determine 
empirically whether the social psychological concept of labeling theory 
applied to individuals with a “low visibility” of indebtedness.65 Through 
his series of interviews, Hayes concluded that all forty-six individuals 
experienced a form of labeling, which in turn produced feelings of 
shame.66 Hayes identified three forms of labeling: direct, indirect, and self-
labeling. Some of Hayes’s participants experienced episodes of direct 
labeling during interpersonal communications with family members, 
friends, and strangers. Direct labeling occurred when negative statements 
and opinions of indebtedness in general and dissatisfaction with the 
debtor’s conduct in particular were shared with the debtor.67 Upon learning 
of the debt situation, some of these individuals also expressed their 
opinions that the debtor had a problem with finances that needed 
correcting.68 At some point, these interactions caused debtors to feel shame 
about their conduct in incurring unmanageable debt.69 
The participants in Hayes’s study also experienced indirect labeling, 
which is subtle and suggestive rather than confrontational (as with direct 
labeling). The indirect labeling occurred in interpersonal exchanges 
through verbal cues (e.g., suggestions or questions), nonverbal means 
(e.g., body language and facial expressions), or a combination of both.70 
Similarly, episodes of indirect labeling also eventually led to feelings of 
                                                     
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 390. 
 64. Id. at 390–91. 
 65. Hayes, supra note 19, at 30–31. 
 66. Id. at 33. 
 67. Id. at 33–35. 
 68. Id. at 33. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 36. 
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shame for the debtors.71 Finally, in Hayes’s study some of the participants 
also engaged in self-labeling, leading to feelings of embarrassment and 
shame over their conduct in incurring unmanageable debt even though no 
one else knew of their problem.72 Moreover, Hayes found that although 
the three forms of labeling invoked shame, it usually arose only after 
debtors experienced a period of denial over the existence and extent of 
their financial problem.73 
In 2006, Professors Deborah Thorne and Leon Anderson published 
their qualitative study of bankruptcy stigma after conducting semi-
structured interviews with former Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors. Thorne 
and Anderson collected data directly from debtors in order “to assess their 
experiences of stigmatization.”74 More particularly, Thorne and Anderson 
centered their analysis on the “stigma management strategies [debtors] 
invoke to mitigate the shame and social disapprobation [the debtors] 
experienced as a result of their bankruptcies.”75 
Thorne and Anderson found that 95% of the debtors they interviewed 
in their study expressed feelings of shame and stigmatization as they 
underwent the bankruptcy process.76 Thorne and Anderson categorized 
debtors’ stigma management techniques into three generalized categories: 
“concealment,” “avoidance,” and “deviance avowal.”77 As to the first 
category, Thorne and Anderson found that 80% of their participants made 
a concerted effort to conceal their bankruptcy filings from either their 
parents, co-workers, employers, or some combination of these 
constituencies. As Thorne and Anderson described, “[a]nxiety over the 
possibility of . . . disclosure loomed large in interviewees’ experiences.”78 
With respect to the management strategy of “avoidance,” Thorne and 
Anderson found that the fear of potential stigmatization caused debtors to 
engage in a variety of behaviors in an effort “to avoid situations that might 
lead to embarrassing or degrading interactions with non-intimates who 
would have particular reason to uncover their economic troubles and 
failures.”79 Bill collectors fall most prominently into this category. The 
debtors in the Thorne and Anderson study avoided answering the phone, 
shunned opening the mailbox, and utilized caller ID to screen incoming 
                                                     
 71. Id. at 37. 
 72. Id. at 41. 
 73. Id. at 43. 
 74. Thorne & Anderson, supra note 19, at 78. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 82–83. 
 77. Id. at 83. 
 78. Id. at 85. 
 79. Id. at 86. 
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phone calls.80 Other debtors physically hid from friends and family 
members, lest their economic situation be exposed and questioned.81 
The third management strategy utilized by debtors was identified by 
Thorne and Anderson as “deviance avowal,” a theory that originates in the 
sociological literature. The disavowal of the discredited “bankruptcy 
debtor” status, according to Thorne and Anderson, “enabled individuals to 
cope with stigma by arguing in one way or another that their particular 
cases were emphatically not examples of typical deviant role enactment.”82 
In essence, by utilizing deviance avowal, the debtors in the Thorne and 
Anderson study attempted to separate themselves and their conduct from 
the discredited status of bankrupt debtor. They accomplished this feat 
through “distancing,” “accounts,” and “post-bankruptcy actions and 
statements directed toward transcending their stigmatized status.”83 
As Thorne and Anderson found, the concept of distancing was very 
common among the debtors in their study; that is, debtors “went to 
considerable lengths to distinguish their ‘legitimate’ reasons for declaring 
bankruptcy from the otherwise illegitimate and morally objectionable 
actions and rationales of other bankrupt debtors.”84 The debtors in the 
Thorne and Anderson study accomplished this distancing by, among other 
ways, depicting other debtors as financially frivolous and profligate, or as 
simply lacking in financial self-control.85 In contrast to these qualities, the 
debtors interviewed by Thorne and Anderson self-described their pre-
bankruptcy consumption behaviors as “conservative” and “based on 
necessities” rather than luxuries.86 
Regarding the use of “accounts” as a deviance avowal strategy, 
Thorne and Anderson found that the debtors in their study often provided 
“excuses” and “justifications” for their bankruptcy filings, all in an effort 
to “soften the moral breach” of their deviant act.87 Using excuses to 
explain their bankruptcy filings allowed debtors to deny responsibility for 
their conduct and to find a scapegoat for their behavior.88 For example, 
debtors in the Thorne and Anderson study blamed lenders for the need to 
file bankruptcy relief; they characterized the lenders as irresponsibly 
setting debtors up for failure by virtue of their lending practices.89 Other 
                                                     
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 86–87. 
 82. Id. at 87. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 88. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 91. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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debtors excused their bankruptcy filings by relying on unexpected or 
exogenous events, such as a job downsizing, medical illness, or 
downtrodden economy.90 
In the last form of deviance avowal, Thorne and Anderson found that 
debtors attempted to “transcend” their bankruptcy experience by 
promising some form of future action that would hopefully effectuate a 
“destigmatization” of their devalued status, such as by repaying some of 
the discharged debt or by utilizing the knowledge gained “through their 
financial travails to help others avoid similar problems” in the future.91 
In 2013, I published my own qualitative study of bankruptcy stigma 
based upon fifty-eight in-depth interviews with former Chapter 7 
debtors.92 The consumer debtors in my study expressed a wide range of 
attitudes and feelings regarding their indebtedness, which I categorized 
into three sub-groupings of responses. A portion of the debtors conveyed 
the expected internalized feelings of shame and stigma regarding their 
debt. A second sub-grouping expressed little to no shame over having filed 
for bankruptcy and instead identified justifications for the filing. The third 
sub-grouping expressed what I described as a “diluted sense of shame.”93 
Although these individuals felt some degree of shame and embarrassment 
regarding their financial past, they tempered their feelings by either 
blaming their circumstances on external events, rationalizing that 
bankruptcy is commonplace, or engaging in deviance avowal as identified 
by Thorne and Anderson. 
Given the existing literature on debt and bankruptcy stigma, this 
study attempts to forge new ground by investigating whether debt stigma 
is experienced differently depending upon social class, and what possible 
bearing such a finding might have on an individual’s sense of self-esteem 
and personal identity. The next Part reports the study’s methodology and 
principal findings. 
II. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
Since 1972, the GSS has gathered data on American society “in order 
to monitor and explain trends and constants in attitudes, behaviors and 
attributes” of the American population.94 The GSS is a biannual, 
representative sample of non-incarcerated, non-homeless American 
adults.95 “The GSS contains a standard core of demographic, behavioral, 
                                                     
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 93. 
 92. See generally Sousa, supra note 6, at 446. 
 93. Id. at 463. 
 94. NORC, supra note 21. 
 95. DAVID KREMELBERG, PRACTICAL STATISTICS 66 (2011). 
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and attitudinal questions, plus topics of special interest. Among the topics 
covered are civil liberties, crime and violence, intergroup tolerance, 
morality, national spending priorities, psychological well-being, social 
mobility, and stressful and traumatic events.”96 
As noted above, one attitudinal question the GSS asks respondents 
relates to bankruptcy and indebtedness. In particular, the GSS researchers 
ask survey respondents the following question: “Do you think a person has 
the right to end his or her own life if this person has gone bankrupt?”97 
Like many cross-sectional, representative social surveys, the GSS does not 
necessarily ask the same questions every year. With respect to this suicide-
upon-bankruptcy question, the GSS did not ask this question prior to 1977, 
and omitted this question from the surveys in 1980, 1984 and 1987. 
However, the GSS has included this question with relative consistency 
since 1988. 
To test the research question regarding debt stigma and social class, 
four discrete interval years were chosen for statistical analysis:1983, 1994, 
2004, and 2014. Because the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question was not 
asked of respondents in 1984, 1983 was chosen as the initial year—
notably, having been taken only a few years after the promulgation of the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code.98 It is believed that 1994 serves as another 
significant year because the credit industry’s lobbying efforts and public 
advertising campaigns regarding allegedly immoral debtors filing for 
bankruptcy protection had already commenced.99 Further, as previously 
noted, the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were largely 
premised upon the notion that “can-pay” debtors were simply shirking 
their contractual responsibilities by shedding their debts in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy.100 Thus, the year 2004 was selected to gauge attitudes prior to 
the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, 2014 was selected 
in keeping with the ten-year interval increments, and the year represents a 
period of time after BAPCPA normalized bankruptcy law, as well as a 
time after the Great Recession of 2008. 
In 1983, 6.57% of GSS respondents answered the debt–stigma 
question in the affirmative, that is, agreeing with the question that an 
                                                     
 96. NORC, supra note 21. 
 97. The GSS asks three other independent attitudinal questions regarding whether a person has 
a right to end his or her life based upon some condition or event as follows: (1) “Do you think a person 
has the right to end his or her own life if this person has an incurable disease?”; (2) “Do you think a 
person has the right to end his or her own life if this person has dishonored his or her family?”; and 
(3) “Do you think a person has the right to end his or her own life if this person is tired of living and 
ready to die?” 
 98. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012). 
 99. Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 189, 194 (1999). 
 100. See supra Part I. 
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individual has the right to end his or her life if he or she goes bankrupt 
(103 out of 1,568). Eleven years later in 1994, 9.33% of respondents 
answered this question in the affirmative (181 out of 1,939). Ten years 
later, and the year before BAPCPA took effect (2004), the percentage of 
affirmative responses increased to 11.27% (101 out of 896). This upward 
trend in percentage increases continued in 2014, where 12.12% of the GSS 
respondents answered the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question in the 
affirmative (200 out of 1,650). Consequently, these raw numbers provide 
some evidence of an increased notion of debt stigma over a thirty-one-year 
period of time. 
To begin testing whether notions regarding debt stigma vary by 
social class, the variables of education, occupational prestige score, and 
annual income were used to test whether the means of these continuous 
variables differed by how respondents answered the debt–stigma question 
for each year studied.101 These variables are frequently used as indicators 
of objective socioeconomic status.102 Table 1 provides the means for these 













“Yes” $34,827.91 14.02 45.34 
“No” $27,621.71 12.34 38.65 
 
To test whether these differences are statistically significant for 
1983, an independent, two-tailed t-test (assuming equal variances) was 








t statistic -2.4138 -3.8054 -3.9374 
df 1566 1566 1566 
                                                     
 101. All statistical tests were performed using the STATA statistical software program. 
 102. Spencer L. James & Paul R. Amato, Self-Esteem and the Reproduction of Social Class, 94 
SOC. SCI. Q. 933, 941 (2013). 
 103. Simply put, t-tests “are used when you want to test the difference between two groups on 
some continuous variable.” KREMELBERG, supra note 95, at 129. 
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p value .0159 .0001 .0001 
 
Based upon the obtained p values, there is a statistically significant 
difference in the means for income, educational level, and occupational 
prestige score between those who agree with the debt–stigma question and 
for those who do not. The probabilities that these differences are real are 
98.41% for income, 99.99% for education, and 99.99% for occupational 













“Yes” $35,588.51 15.08 45.93 








t statistic -4.1395 -4.9260 -4.0049 
df 1937 1937 1937 
p value .0001 .0001 .0001 
 
Based upon the obtained p values, in 1994 a statistically significant 
difference remains in the means for income, educational level, and 
occupational prestige score between those who agree with the suicide-
upon-bankruptcy question and for those who do not. The probabilities that 
these differences are real are 99.99% for income, education, and 
occupational prestige score. Tables 5 and 6 replicate these tests for the next 













“Yes” $41,169.94 15.12 45.87 
“No” $31,947.46 13.58 40.49 








t statistic -2.3477 -3.6604 -3.1784 
df 894 894 894 
p value .0191 .0003 .0015 
 
Ten years later, a similar difference in means demonstrates these 
three factors are indicative of whether someone will agree or disagree with 
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. The probabilities that these 
differences are real are 98.09% for income, 99.97% for years of education, 
and 99.85% for occupational prestige. Tables 7 and 8 provide data for 








t statistic -5.0392 -5.0030 -4.6612 
df 1648 1648 1648 
p value .0001 .0001 .0001 
   
As evidenced in Tables 7 and 8, this trend of statistical significance 
between the measures of objective social class continued a decade later in 
2014. The probabilities that these observed differences are due to a real 
effect are 99.99% for all three variables, namely, annual income, years of 
education, and occupational prestige score. 
The data provided in Tables 1 through 8 detail the existence of real 
differences between individuals who responded either “yes” or “no” to the 
debt–stigma question based upon objective indicators of social class. The 
next step of the research design was to uncover whether associations 
existed between these individuals and other attitudinal questions as 
measured by the GSS. The following five variables proved fruitful for 
exploration as affecting one’s proclivity to respond to a question justifying 
Table 7. 2014 
(means) 







“Yes” $40,922.15 14.50 46.74 
“No” $28,349.58 13.62 41.21 
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suicide as a response to financial indebtedness: (1) self-identified social 
class; (2) whether the respondent reported themselves as “happy” in life 
generally; (3) a respondent’s political views; (4) a respondent’s categorical 
educational classification; and (5) a respondent’s strength of religious 
affiliation. 
For self-identified social class, respondents were asked to categorize 
themselves as either lower-class, working-class, middle-class, or upper-
class. The variable “happy”104 was used as a substitute for a respondent’s 
mental health, as questions specifically addressing mental health (e.g., the 
existence of depression or number of poor mental health days in the past 
30 days) were not introduced by the GSS until the late 2000s.105 The 
“happy” variable was recoded into three categories, namely, “not too 
happy,” “pretty happy,” and “very happy.” A respondent’s political views 
was recoded from seven discrete responses into three general categories, 
namely, “liberal,” “moderate,” and “conservative.” Years of education 
was recoded from a continuous variable into a categorical variable, 
employing the following four possible categories for respondents: less 
than high school, high school, some college, and college graduate. Finally, 
as coded by the GSS, a respondent’s religious affiliation is divided into the 
following four categories: “no religion,” “somewhat strong” religious 
affiliation, “not very strong” religious affiliation, and “strong” religious 
affiliation. This variable was not recoded for purposes of analysis. 
To explore whether a relationship exists between these categorical 
variables and the dummy variable106 of answering “yes” or “no” to the 
suicide-upon-bankruptcy question, a series of chi-square tests were 
performed.107 All of the chi-square tests reported were conducted at an 
alpha of .05 (95%). 
                                                     
 104. The specific GSS survey question for the “happy” variable is as follows: “Taken all 
together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty 
happy, or not too happy?” 
 105. The GSS does ask respondents questions regarding their mental health. One question is as 
follows: “Has a doctor, nurse, or other health professional ever told you that you had depression?” In 
addition, respondents are also asked the following question: “Now thinking about your mental health, 
which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions, for how many days during the past 30 
days was your mental health not good?” The first question was only asked of respondents in 2014, 
while the second question regarding mental health was first introduced in 2002 and has not been 
consistently asked since that time. Consequently, the “happy” variable was chosen as a proxy for a 
particular respondent’s state of mental health, particularly since this question has been asked by the 
GSS consistently since 1972. 
 106. A “dummy variable” is a “variable that has been recoded so that one of its categories has a 
value of 1 and the other category has a value of 0.” ROYCE A. SINGLETON, JR. & BRUCE C. STRAITS, 
APPROACHES TO SOCIAL RESEARCH 521 (6th ed. 2018). 
 107. “The chi-square statistic is used to show whether or not there is a relationship between two 
categorical variables.” KREMELBERG, supra note 95, at 120. Accord ANNA LEON-GUERRERO & 
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 Table 9 reports the results of the chi-square test of independence 
regarding the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question and a respondent’s self-
identified class. Based upon the obtained p values in 1983, 1994, and 2014, 
there is a statistically significant relationship between respondents’ self-
identified social class and their response to the suicide-upon-bankruptcy 
survey question. For 2004, the obtained p value is marginally significant. 
Nonetheless, it appears that from 1983 to 2014, people’s self-identified 
social class is statistically associated with their response to the debt–
stigma question in the GSS. 
 
Table 10 reports the chi-square results regarding the general 
happiness variable. Because the p values for general happiness are larger 
than the tested alpha at .05 (95%), these results are not statistically 
significant, representing a lack of association between people’s general 
happiness and their proclivity to either agree or disagree with the suicide-
upon-bankruptcy survey question. 
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(2015). 
Table 9. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Self-Identified 
Class 











p value .002 .010 .092 .0001 
Table 10. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and General 
Happiness 











p value 0.928 0.466 0.984 0.906 
Table 11. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Strength of 
Religious Affiliation 











p value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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The same, however, cannot be said for the association between one’s 
strength of religious affiliation and the response to the debt–stigma 
question. As demonstrated in Table 11, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between these two variables. In other words, there is a 
statistical association between an individual’s response to the suicide-
upon-bankruptcy survey question and one’s religious affiliation. Tables 12 
and 13 test the association between the debt–stigma question and one’s 




Table 12 demonstrates a statistically significant relationship between 
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question and one’s political views for 
years 1994, 2004, and 2014; however, for 1983, this relationship is 
marginally significant but nevertheless important. In Table 13, the data 
reveal a statistically significant relationship across all years between 
people’s level of education and their response to the suicide-upon-
bankruptcy question. As a result of the chi-square tests, a statistically 
significant association exists between the debt–stigma question and the 
variables of self-identified class, strength of religious affiliation, political 
views, and level of education—but not one’s mental state of relative 
happiness. 
In order to further investigate the relationship of these variables upon 
the debt–stigma question, a series of logistic regression models were 
performed.108 Out of the 9,941 GSS respondents overall in the years 1983, 
                                                     
 108. Logistic regression was chosen primarily because the dependent variable (i.e., the suicide-
upon-bankruptcy question) is a binary variable. The variable “happy” was omitted from the regression 
Table 12. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Political Views 











p value 0.093 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Table 13. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Education Level 











p value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
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1994, 2004, and 2014, 6,053 answered the suicide-upon-bankruptcy 
question (61%). In addition, another 1,055 respondents have missing data 
on other predictor variables (10.6%), thereby rendering an actual sample 
size of 4,998 respondents for the regression models. Table 14 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the predictor variables while Table 15 presents the 
results of the regression models. 
                                                     
models because the initial tests demonstrated no association between general happiness and 
responding to the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. 







Table 14. Descriptive Statistics  












Sex .5302/.4991 .4881/.5004  .5350/.4988 
Age 46.65/7.35 43.82/15.39  46.97/17.53 
Race 
White .8117/.3909  .8498/.3576  .8074/.3944 
African-American .1313/.3377  .1008/.3013 .1347/.3414 









Prestige 41.72/15.76 46.64/14.68  41.16/15.78 
Political View 
Liberal .2613/.4394  .3913/.4885 .2467/.4311 
Moderate .3866/.4870  .3063/.4614 .3956/.4890 
Conservative .3521/.4777  .3024/.4597 .3577/.4794 
Education 
College Graduate .2781/.4481 .5079/.5004 .2522/.4343 
Less than 
High School .1635/.3698 .0771/.2670 .1732/.3785 
High School .2943/.4558  .1542/.3615  .3101/.4626  
Some College .26411/.4409  .2609/.4395 .2645/.4411 
Religious 
Affiliation 
No Religion .1383/.3452  .2984/.4580  .1202/.3252  
Somewhat Strong .0892/.2851  .0573/.2327  .0928/.2902 
Not Very Strong .3944/.4888  .3933/.4889 .3945/.4888 
Strong .3782/.4850  .2510/.4340 .3925/.4884 
Source: The General Social Survey (Years 1983, 1994, 2004, 2014) 































  (SE)   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)   (SE) 
Demo 





















   -0.0549    -0.0557    -0.0569    -0.0535    -0.0549    -0.0521 
Sex 0.8765    0.8638    0.844 † 0.8332 † 0.8619    0.9204 
   -0.0837    -0.0825    -0.0804    -0.0802    -0.0836    -0.0911 
African-
American 





   -0.118    -0.1139    -0.1151    -0.1225    -0.1314    -0.1475 
Other 
Race 
0.6849 † 0.7049 
  
0.6703 † 0.6637 † 0.6923 † 0.6829 






















   -0.0029    -0.003    -0.0029    -0.003    -0.0031    -0.0032 
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1.0102 
     







*            
1.007 * 1.0093 
         -0.0033                -0.0035    -0.0036 
Working-
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               -0.2894          -0.2445      
Middle-






               -0.4685          -0.2826      
Upper-
Class 







               -1.1663          -0.543      
Less than High 
School 










                     -0.045    -0.0669    -0.0601 
High 
School 










                     -0.0353    -0.0491    -0.045 
Some 
College 










                     -0.0565    -0.0711    -0.0671 
Religion                                 
Some-
what 
Strong                              
0.2957 
                                 -0.0651 
Not Very 
Strong                              
0.5057 
                                 -0.0639 
Strong                               0.316 
                                 -0.0449 
Political 
Views                                 
Moderate                               0.657 
                                 -0.0787 
Con-
servative                              
0.6791 
                                 -0.0831 
Intercept 0.1268   0.0635   0.112   0.3307   0.1906   0.4702 
N 4998   4998   4998   4998   4998   4998 
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Source: The General Social Survey (Survey Years 1983, 1994, 2004 & 2014) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10.  
 
Model 1 includes the demographic indicators of sex, race, and age 
because these measures are inherently related to suicide.109 Of these three, 
only age is statistically significant (p < .001), suggesting a positive 
association between one’s age and agreeing with the debt–stigma question. 
For each one-year increase in age, the odds of agreeing with the debt–
stigma question decrease by 1.34%. The year variable is statistically 
significant as well (p < .001); with each additional ten-year period of time, 
the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question actually increase by 
21.5%. This is further evidence suggesting that the stigma surrounding 
debt and bankruptcy has actually increased over time rather than 
decreased.110 Regarding the measures of socioeconomic class, Model 1 
includes annual income as a covariate. Annual income is statistically 
significant (p < .001); with every $5,000 increase in an individual’s annual 
income, the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question increase by 
4.2%. In other words, Model 1 presents a positive association between 
higher income and agreeing with the debt–stigma question. 
Model 2 replaces occupational prestige as a covariate for annual 
income to test whether occupational prestige is also positively associated 
with a response to the debt–stigma question. Age remains statistically 
significant (p < .001), where each additional year in age reduces the odds 
of agreeing with the debt–stigma question by 1.57%. Controlling for other 
variables, occupational prestige is statistically significant (p < .001), as 
was annual income in Model 1. For each one-unit increase in occupational 
prestige score, the odds of agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy 
question increase by 2.5%. This finding suggests that the higher a person’s 
occupational prestige as measured by societal standards, the likelihood of 
agreeing with the debt–stigma question increases.111 
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Model 3 introduces the covariate of self-identified social class and 
replaces it for the occupational prestige variable from Model 2.112 
Regarding self-identified social class, the respondents who identify as 
either middle-class or upper-class are statistically significant in 
comparison to the reference group, namely, those respondents who 
identify as lower-class, controlling for all other variables. Regarding the 
middle-class respondents, their odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma 
question are increased by 101.7% as compared to lower-class respondents 
(p = .003). The results for upper-class respondents are even more 
dramatic. Upper-class respondents have increased odds of 289.1% in 
agreeing with the debt–stigma question as compared to lower-class 
respondents (p < .001). Although not statistically significant for 
respondents who self-identify as working-class (p=.379), their odds of 
agreeing with the debt–stigma question are increased by 23% as compared 
to lower-class respondents. In other terms, Model 3 suggests that self-
identified social class matters regarding whether a person will likely agree 
with the debt–stigma question; the higher an individual’s perceived social 
class and station in life, the more likely he or she will agree with the 
suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question. 
Model 4 introduces the covariate of education as a replacement for 
self-identified social class as a measure of socioeconomic status.113 In the 
GSS, the variable for education is a continuous variable (i.e., years of 
education). However, for regression analysis this variable was recoded 
into a categorical variable with the following four categories: (1) less than 
a high school education; (2) high school education; (3) some college 
experience; or (4) college education. Regarding education, as compared to 
those respondents with a college education, respondents who possess less 
than a high school education have reduced odds of 75% in agreeing with 
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question, and this finding is statistically 
significant (p < .001). Those who possess a high school education have 
reduced odds of 74.06% in agreeing with the debt–stigma question as 
compared to the college educated respondents, and this finding is also 
statistically significant (p < .001). Finally, for the respondents who possess 
some college experience, their odds are also reduced by 51.3% in agreeing 
with the debt–stigma question as compared to the college educated, and 
this finding is statistically significant (p < .001). In short, as a measure of 
socioeconomic status, one’s level of education has a positive association 
in agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. Thus, the higher a 
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person’s level of education, the more likely that they will agree with the 
debt–stigma question. 
Model 5 adds all four covariates for socioeconomic status, namely, 
annual income, occupational prestige score, self-identified class, and 
education, in order to determine the attenuation between variables. As 
evidenced in Table 15, occupational prestige score and education remain 
statistically significant, while self-identified class and annual income are 
no longer so.114 Regarding occupational prestige, with each one-unit 
increase in occupational prestige the odds increase by 1% in agreeing with 
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question (p < .05). For education, the same 
observation from Model 4 carries over to Model 5; that is, as compared to 
the college educated, respondents with less than a high school education 
have reduced odds of 66.55% in agreeing with the debt–stigma question, 
a result which is statistically significant (p < .001). Further, those who 
possess a high school education have reduced odds of 67.55% in agreeing 
with the debt–stigma question as compared to the college educated, a 
statistically significant result (p < .001). Finally, respondents with some 
college experience have reduced odds of 42.99% in agreeing with the 
debt–stigma question as compared to those who have obtained a college 
degree; this finding is statistically significant (p < .001).115 
Model 6 adds the covariates of strength of religious affiliation and 
political persuasion to test whether these variables attenuate the statistical 
significance of the socioeconomic variables upon the debt–stigma 
question. Because self-identified class and income were not statistically 
significant in Model 5, these covariates were omitted from the final model, 
Model 6. For measures of socioeconomic status, education and 
occupational prestige score were included in the model. The working 
hypothesis was that the more religious or more conservative (or both) a 
respondent reported to be, this would cause him or her to be less likely to 
agree with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. This pattern emerged as 
demonstrated in Table 15.116 Regarding strength of religious affiliation, as 
compared to those respondents who claimed to have no religious 
affiliation (i.e., the reference category), respondents who have a 
“somewhat strong” religious affiliation have reduced odds of 70.43% in 
agreeing with the debt–stigma question, and this finding is statistically 
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significant (p < .001). For those reporting a “not very strong” religious 
affiliation, the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question are reduced 
by 49.43%, a finding that is also statistically significant (p < .001). For 
those respondents reporting a “strong” religious affiliation, they have 
reduced odds of 68.4% in agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy 
question, and this too is statistically significant (p < .001). Consequently, 
having some religious affiliation reduces an individual’s odds of agreeing 
with the debt–stigma question. 
The covariate of political persuasion is also statistically significant 
and thus demonstrates a positive association with the debt–stigma 
question. But much like the direction of religious affiliation, the data 
suggest that as compared to those respondents who report a liberal political 
affiliation (i.e., the reference group), moderates and conservatives have 
reduced odds of agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. 
More specifically, and again as compared to liberals, political moderates 
have reduced odds of 34.3% in agreeing with the question; this finding is 
statistically significant (p < .001). Regarding conservative respondents, 
the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question are reduced by 32.09% 
as compared to liberals, and this too is statistically significant (p < .001). 
The surprise in Model 6 is that although controlling for both strength 
of religious affiliation and political persuasion, the socioeconomic 
variables of occupational prestige and education remain positively 
associated with the debt–stigma question.117 Regarding occupational 
prestige, with each one-unit increase in occupational prestige score, the 
odds of agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question increase by 
.93% (p < .05). Regarding education, as again compared to the college 
educated (i.e., the reference group), those respondents with less than a high 
school education have reduced odds of 69.46% of agreeing with the 
suicide-upon-bankruptcy question (p < .001). For those respondents 
reporting a high school education, their odds of agreeing with the debt–
stigma question are reduced by 69.75% (p < .001). And finally, those 
respondents who have some college experience have reduced odds of 
45.87% in agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question 
(p < .001). 
Based upon the logistic regression models, the data present initial 
evidence of a systematic pattern between debt stigma and social class, 
namely, that one’s objective and subjective social class position predicts 
an individual’s proclivity to agree with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy 
question. More precisely, tested independently, the objective 
socioeconomic indicators of annual income, education, and occupational 
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prestige are positively associated with the debt–stigma question. The 
higher an individual’s  annual income, educational level, and occupational 
prestige score, the greater likelihood of him or her agreeing with the 
proposition that a person has the right to take their own life upon “going 
bankrupt.” This same conclusion holds true for subjective social class 
when measured independently. That is, middle-class and upper-class 
respondents have significantly greater odds of agreeing with the suicide-
upon-bankruptcy question as compared to lower-class respondents. 
Further, once all of the objective and subjective covariates for 
socioeconomic class are included in the model, the objective measures of 
education and occupational prestige remain statistically significant; the 
higher one’s educational level and the greater one’s occupational prestige, 
the more likely that he or she is inclined to agree that suicide is a justifiable 
response to an individual “going bankrupt.” As the final model 
demonstrates, these two measures of objective socioeconomic class 
remain relevant and statistically significant in predicting such a response, 
even in the presence of two other statistically significant covariates that 
reduce one’s proclivity to respond affirmatively to the suicide-upon-
bankruptcy question, namely, strength of religious affiliation and political 
persuasion. 
As other scholars have noted, “stigma . . . is linked to an individual’s 
social identity.”118 The GSS data suggest that class distinctions exist 
regarding debt or bankruptcy stigma, or both. Using the suicide-upon-
bankruptcy question as a proxy for stigma, the lower- and working- classes 
report less stigma regarding debt and bankruptcy based upon their survey 
responses. Inversely, the higher one’s social class as measured by income, 
occupational prestige, and education, the more inclined one is in agreeing 
with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. The next Part attempts to 
situate these empirical findings within the sociological social psychology 
literature in a first effort to explain this apparent social phenomenon. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The results of the foregoing statistical tests paint an initial picture of 
the connection between social class and debt stigma in the United States. 
Simply stated, the data suggest a positive association between social class 
and perceiving stigma regarding indebtedness. The higher an individual’s 
social class as measured by the objective indicators of education, income, 
and occupational prestige, as well as self-identified subjective class, the 
greater the likelihood that he or she will agree with the acceptability of 
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suicide in response to “going bankrupt.” I contend that the American 
structure of individualistic capitalism and social psychology offers a 
framework for explaining why this is so. 
From a structural standpoint, the explanation begins with the 
American ideals of individualism and self-reliance. Peter L. Callero 
defines the concept of “individualism” in the following terms: 
[I]ndividualism is a belief system that privileges the individual over 
the group, private life over public life, and personal expression over 
social experience; it is a worldview where autonomy, independence, 
and self-reliance are highly valued and thought to be natural; and it 
is an ideology based on self-determination, where free actors are 
assumed to make choices that have direct consequences for their own 
unique destiny.119 
Callero argues that individualism is not only “one of the most 
dominant values in American society”120 but also the “defining 
characteristic of American culture.”121 The American ideal of 
individualism and self-reliance pervades all aspects of social life but 
perhaps none more than our economic system. Indeed, under this societal 
ethos of individualism and self-reliance in economic affairs, one’s social 
position is the product of effort and talent.122 Consequently, individuals 
are personally responsible for their class position.123 Despite the multitude 
of structural forces that influence our economic class position and personal 
finances, Americans remain tied to the notion that through some 
combination of hard work, persistence, and raw talent, anyone can achieve 
financial success and stability.124 The problem with this premise of 
meritocracy, of course, is that it tends “to overestimate the effects of merit 
on economic outcomes and to underestimate the effects of nonmerit 
factors.”125 Nonetheless, Americans remain steadfast in the belief that 
meritocracy undergirds our economic lives.126 
Accepting as true that many, if not most, Americans adhere to the 
concept of economic meritocracy, then those who find themselves clinging 
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to the lower economic rungs in society deserve their fate. It is consequently 
understandable that when financial calamity strikes an individual or family 
and debt service simply becomes no longer manageable, attribution of the 
economic plight is associated with personal failings and limitations. In a 
society that “puts a heavy emphasis on personal agency and independent 
effort, it can be difficult to recognize or acknowledge the controlling 
influence of large social processes.”127 
Americans’ general adherence to the social structure of economic 
meritocracy has relevance for an individual’s social identity. In this 
context, identity is the “internalized statuses” by which individuals 
categorize and present themselves to the outside world.128 Stryker and 
Burke’s observation that social structure can have consequences for an 
individual’s social identity undergirds this assertion.129 In fact, Katherine 
Newman explored this proposition in her classic ethnographic study of 
downward mobility among the American middle-class. Although not 
particular to debt stigma, Newman’s findings regarding occupational loss 
provide a useful analogy. Newman concludes as follows on this point: 
One’s occupation . . . [is] viewed as a test of commitment, and the 
product of hard work and self-sacrifice. Cast this way, success is not 
a matter of luck, good contacts, credentials, or technical skill but is a 
measure of one’s moral worth, one’s willingness and ability to drive 
beyond the limitations of self-indulgence and sloth. It is this equation 
of occupational success and inner or moral qualities that rebounds on 
the unemployed manager’s self-image, making him or her feel not 
just unsuccessful but worthless.130 
By analogy, becoming mired in debt and possibly needing to file for 
bankruptcy as a result has “consequences that reach down deep to core 
issues of self and identity.”131 Such financial distress is undoubtedly an 
“overwhelming blow to one’s social identity and sense of self.”132 Simply 
put, for many individuals, incurring substantial, unmanageable debt and 
possibly needing to file for bankruptcy represents a disastrous fall from 
the social class hierarchy, one that can shatter an individual’s sense of self 
and identity. 
                                                     
 127. CALLERO, supra note 119, at 113. 
 128. LIZABETH A. CRAWFORD & KATHERINE B. NOVAK, INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY: 
SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 212 (2014). 
 129. See generally Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity 
Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284 (2000). 
 130. KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF DOWNWARD 
MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 76 (1988). 
 131. CALLERO, supra note 119, at 112. 
 132. Id. at 113. 
998 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:965 
Based upon the findings of this study, it is the individuals with the 
higher levels of education, the greater annual incomes, the higher 
occupational prestige scores, and the higher self-identified class that are 
most likely to agree with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question. 
The prospect of severe indebtedness is apparently so salient to their 
internalized social identities and sense of social worth that these 
respondents are accepting of suicide as a consequence of debt (at least as 
indicated by their responses to the GSS). Perhaps this is so because, as 
Thomas J. Gorman uncovered in his qualitative work, individuals judge 
themselves on the bases of income, levels of education, and occupational 
prestige.133 That is, components of self-worth include one’s educational 
credentials, income, and occupational prestige. Further, one’s objective or 
perceived social class can have a distinct effect on one’s response to a 
particular situation. Rebecca Sandefur articulates this sentiment in the 
following terms: “Social class and socioeconomic differences in how 
people experience problems and respond to them can mean that the same 
initial event . . . creates very different consequences for those in different 
class positions.”134 
The GSS data suggest that for individuals in the middle- and upper- 
classes, “going bankrupt” represents falling from a position of seemingly 
hard-earned social status in the American economic meritocracy. In a 
society that places so much emphasis on economic success, the incurrence 
of unmanageable debt may be the quintessential symbol of economic 
failure, one that speaks louder to middle- and upper-class individuals’ 
internal measure of self-worth and self-esteem. According to sociological 
social psychology, the notion of self-esteem arises from three sources: 
reflected appraisals, social comparisons, and self-perceptions.135 
The first measure of self-esteem, reflected appraisals, harkens back 
to Charles Cooley’s the “looking-glass self.”136 Simply stated, Cooley 
argued that an individual’s sense of self, and by extrapolation one’s self-
esteem, is developed through interactions with other members of 
society.137 More particularly, reflected appraisals, which constitute 
“images of yourself based on your perceptions of what other people think 
about you,” form a “basis for creating and confirming self-concepts.”138 
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When an individual’s reflected appraisals from others match that person’s 
salient identity, the person’s self-esteem is buoyed.139 In contrast, when 
reflected appraisals no longer corroborate one’s identity, an individual’s 
self-esteem can be damaged.140 As Charles Jaret and colleagues argue, it 
can be “disconcerting and potentially deflating to one’s sense of having a 
distinctive identity to realize that other people attach great significance to 
categories such as one’s . . . social status,”141 especially if there is a 
mismatch between perception and identity. If based upon one’s 
possessions, occupation, income, and education others view him or her as 
distinctly middle- or upper-class, the incurrence of unmanageable debt can 
certainly cause a disconnect between a person’s reflected appraisals and 
internalized identity as a member of the respected higher classes. As 
Charles Jaret and colleagues found, when reflected appraisals relate to 
one’s roles and statuses (such as social class), there is a negative relation 
to self-esteem.142 This may explain why those in the middle- and upper- 
classes in the GSS, as measured by objective indicators of socioeconomic 
status (i.e., education, income, and occupational prestige) and self-
identified class, are more inclined to agree with the acceptability of 
committing suicide in response to indebtedness if they believe society in 
general places importance on these markers of social class status. 
With respect to the second measure of self-esteem, namely social 
comparison, Susan Fiske notes that social comparison is a universal human 
trait. As Fiske argues, “We compare in order to inform ourselves about 
where we stand. We compare to protect our self-esteem. We compare to 
identify ourselves with our peer group, those others who are similarly 
situated.”143 Empirical evidence exists that middle-class and upper-class 
individuals place great emphasis on the distinctions between themselves 
and the lower social classes.144 Indeed, Michèle Lamont uncovered that 
upper-middle-class Americans tend to exclude others on the basis of 
socioeconomic superiority, as measured by education, income, and 
occupational prestige.145 Further, as Thomas J. Gorman found in his study 
of members from both the working-class and middle-class, people “judge 
                                                     
 139. Morris Rosenberg & Leonard I. Pearlin, Social Class and Self-Esteem Among Children and 
Adults, 84 AM. J. SOC. 53, 63 (1978). 
 140. Joanne M. Kaufman & Cathryn Johnson, Stigmatized Individuals and the Process of 
Identity, 45 SOC. Q. 807, 827–28 (2004). 
 141. Jaret, Reitzes & Shapkina, supra note 138, at 405. 
 142. Id. at 403. 
 143. FISKE, supra note 126, at 27. 
 144. See generally Benjamin Sosnaud et al., Class in Name Only: Subjective Class Identity, 
Objective Class Position, and Vote Choice in American Presidential Elections, 60 SOC. PROBS. 81 
(2013). 
 145. MICHÈLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN: MORALITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF 
RACE, CLASS, AND IMMIGRATION 104 (2000). 
1000 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:965 
[another’s] worth on the basis of income, educational credentials, and 
occupational prestige.”146 These reciprocal feelings of judgment and 
comparison remain hidden but unquestionably serve to “shape daily 
interactions among members of different social classes.”147 In 
interviewing members of the middle-class, Gorman discovered that not 
only do members of the middle-class fear downward mobility but they also 
differentiate and distance themselves from members of the lower-class 
based upon the markers of income, education, and occupational 
prestige.148 
In addition to distancing themselves from members of a lower-class 
as a mechanism of social comparison, middle- and upper-class individuals 
also utilize reference groups in the act of social comparison. In this regard, 
the people in our own social network form the relevant comparisons, 
which in turn set the standards for our behaviors and attitudes.149 As a 
corollary, our self-identity and self-esteem “closely track[] feeling 
included or excluded” in our referent social group.150 If this is the case, it 
is not hard to envision that becoming mired in financial debt and possibly 
resorting to bankruptcy damages the identity and self-esteem of those in 
the middle- and upper- classes, namely those individuals who are supposed 
to be the most economically successful in our financial meritocracy. 
Indeed, grave indebtedness or filing for bankruptcy protection, or both, 
arguably represents a falling from their own reference group and social 
network, something that can undoubtedly distort one’s identity and self-
esteem. 
Finally, identity and self-esteem derive from internal evaluations of 
our own role performances. In this sense, it is well-accepted by 
sociological social psychologists that individuals routinely engage in 
“identity work,” which Tony J. Watson describes, in part, as a process 
whereby individuals make “connections ‘outwards’ to social others as well 
as ‘inwards’ towards the self.”151 In other words, identity work, according 
to Watson, is a process whereby individuals shape and evaluate their own 
“internal identity” as measured against one’s “social identity.” Applied in 
this context, if an individual’s social class is particularly salient to their 
senses of self and identity, then the act of incurring unmanageable debt or 
filing for bankruptcy relief represents a grave disconnect between 
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identifying as middle- or upper-class, and a negative evaluation of role 
performance is likely the end result. 
CONCLUSION 
This empirical Article offers a fresh perspective to the ongoing debt 
and bankruptcy stigma literature by examining whether all debtors are 
created equal or whether a segment of the American population does or 
should view indebtedness differently based upon social class. As the data 
from the GSS suggest, individuals with higher incomes, occupational 
prestige scores, and levels of education are more likely to agree with the 
survey question that an individual has a right to commit suicide upon 
“going bankrupt.” This same observation holds true based upon an 
individual’s self-identified social class, with those identifying as middle- 
or upper-class having greater odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma 
question. 
Not only do these findings add to the social psychology literature on 
self-esteem and personal identity based upon class, but the findings remain 
relevant to consumer and bankruptcy law scholars alike in arguing for and 
against policy changes to the Bankruptcy Code. As measured by specific 
points over the past thirty years, the data indicate that debt stigma remains 
a viable area of study and that the stigma surrounding indebtedness still 
has salience for individuals’ everyday lives. In addition, the GSS data 
suggest that debt stigma has increased rather than decreased over the past 
thirty years, another potential finding of interest to bankruptcy and 
consumer law scholars.152 
The findings of this study suggest at least three avenues for future 
research. First, to the extent that other datasets exist with the same variable 
measures, similar statistical analyses can be done to test the findings of 
this study. Second, qualitative and interpretive research designs can be 
developed to explore this study’s initial findings by conducting in-depth 
interviews with individuals (debtors and non-debtors alike) to explore 
whether responses to indebtedness shift by objective and subjective 
indicators of social class. This can be accomplished by purposefully 
sampling for different social classes and by attempting to find 
“disconfirming evidence”153 of this study’s general findings. Third, based 
upon the results of the logistic regression models, age remained 
statistically significant across all years, whereby increasing one’s age 
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decreased the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question.154 Future 
researchers can explore this apparent association between age and debt 
stigma both quantitatively and qualitatively.155 
For the moment, based upon this initial study, it appears that 
systematic patterns exist regarding notions of debt stigma in American 
society and that individuals may view the phenomenon of grave 
indebtedness quite differently based upon their relative positions in social 
life. Further research in this area may tell us much more about debt, class, 
and identity in American social life. 
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